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Außerdem möchte ich mich herzlich bei meinem Zweitgutachter Prof. Dr. Gerhard Rübel
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Education is the most powerful weapon
which you can use to change the world.
Nelson Mandela1 Introduction
Every generation builds on the fundament all former generations have created. Each
is founded on human capital, like education, knowledge and competence, and physical
capital, like infrastructure and production facilities. In this sense education is one of
the main heritages a society can offer its next generation. That is why many people
vote for free education, both in school and university, to make education affordable
to everybody. Germany decided in the year 2008 at the “Bildungsgipfel” in Dresden
to extend the spending to 10% of its gross domestic product (GDP) for Education
and Research until 2015. Hetmeier, Schmidt, Vogel and Buschle (2015) in their yearly
“Bildungsfinanzbericht” sum up, that the Budget in 2013 was 258.3 billion Euro (9.2%
of the GDP).
But why is education so important? On the one hand, it creates a mindset for
understanding, liberty and free living, is therefore a pillar for a free democracy (e.g.
Swanson and King 1991), and helps keeping a steady economic growth (e.g. Hanushek,
Woessmann, Jamison and Jamison 2008). On the other hand, at the individual level, it
will guarantee a better job and a good standing in society.
Even though this sounds quite plausible, people still seem to self-select into higher
education and lower education not because of learning capacity, but because of their
family background. It’s often argued that free higher education is unfair, since the
nurse pays with his or her tax the education of the chief physician’s son. This indirectly
implies that nurses’ offsprings do not study (e.g. Ermisch and Francesconi 2001).
The modern field economics of education could not arise without the theory of human
capital. Schultz (1963) was the first, who understood education as an investment in
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human capital. Analogous to a companys’ decision to invest in new machines, people
decide to invest in their education. After Schultz formulated these thoughts, a wide
range of extensions has been published. Becker (1964) developed a detailed theory about
human capital investment, with costs and returns. In addition, Parsons (1974) took
imperfect capital markets into account, and Levhari and Weiss (1974) examined how
risk relating to future incomes has an effect on human capital investments. There where
many critics reminding Becker accusingly that the name “Human Capital” treats people
as objects, like machines, but eventually the name and the work got accepted in research
(Becker 1993).
Classical economic theory cannot explain the economic growth of the last century
in Europe and other countries, like the US. The human capital theory closes this gap
and explains the GDP growth with investment in human capital. For example, Denison
(2011) explains about 25% of the growth between 1929 and 1982 with the investment
into human capital, while he cannot assign the remaining growth. Hence, a lot more of
the growth may be based on human capital expansion, which only cannot be identified.
From the governmental point of view, there is little influence on the decision to invest
in human capital. Investment can only be raised by supporting schools and universities
to make education affordable, or by making the school mandatory. Reducing the cost
side could mean offering grants, subsidizing or building universities, and abolishing
tuition fees. The government can raise the amount of scholarships and keep the interest
rates for students loans low. Since overall resources in terms of tax revenues are limited,
a decision has to be taken, if more investment in human capital or more investment
in physical capital is beneficial. Investing into human capital is usually a long run
investment, which takes about 20 years until a generation is grown up to pay off the
investment.
The decision to invest in ones own human capital has to take a lot of lifetime spanning
variables into account. The work of Mincer (1974) tries to evaluate the individual lifetime
income, and how people would rationally decide to study or not to study depending
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on its costs and revenues. Mincer gives a detailed overview about which costs are
relevant, and how to calculate a lifetime income. Of course, costs must include the direct
out-of-pocket costs for the training, or, in case of studying, it must include tuition fees.
But the costs need also include all the missed earnings while being educated. These
opportunity costs consist of non-monetary ones, like missed leisure, and monetary ones,
like missed wages. In the case of studying, the missed wages are in the scale of several
years. On the individual level people decide if they want to extend their own amount of
human capital investment by studying, going back to school (Cohn and Geske 1990),
passing on-job trainings or extending knowledge during free time (Schultz 1982), all for
the sake of getting a better personal future. This better future means higher wages, but
can also mean non-monetary values, such as higher standing or status.
Chapter 2 of this thesis is based on my discussion paper (Ehlers 2011) and uses the
idea of the rational calculation of costs and revenues for studying as base for a model.
However, it will only focus on the differences tuition creates, while all the other values
stay at a specific, unquantified level. The model includes the aforementioned second,
non-monetary aspect of a degree, the social status or prestige. For wealthier people, the
monetary aspects might play an inferior role, while a good standing is more important,
since the social status can’t be bought as such.
On first account it seems clear that nobody will vote for tuition if no surplus is
expected by this money. On the other hand, can a student hope for others staying
away from university by raising tuition fees? If this is the case, a university degree
rises in its status value as the amount of degrees is artificially depleted. Then, just by
having a university degree, one can await a higher social status without any further
needs to delimit from others, for example by attaining good grades. Chapter 2 takes
this correlation into account. It will introduce a model explaining the vote for tuition
by wealthier and more able people, without relying on their expectation of a direct
surplus from these tuitions. The wealthier people will always go to University, as the
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high tuition does not reduce their utility significantly, as a result of the diminishing
marginal utility of money, but yields a relatively high utility in terms of status. Ulti-
mately rasing status is so beneficial, that the costs for higher tuition is willingly incurred.
The social status derived from a universities’ degree could also be seen as a signal for
all actors in the surrounding of an university graduate, especially for employers, even
though the model in chapter 2 did not make use of the signaling theory. In chapter 3 we
use this theory, covering grade inflation and building upon a signaling game invented by
Chan, Hao and Suen (2007), where universities send a signal regarding their distribution
of good and mediocre students to employers. This chapter is based on the paper (Ehlers
and Schwager 2016b), a joint work of Robert Schwager and myself.
Higher wages are paid for higher productivity, as investment in human capital. Having
a degree is also a signal of other quality characteristics. Employers generally suppose
better educated workers to live healthier and have lower incentives to quit or being
absent (Weiss 1995). In short, a university degree not only signals higher productivity,
but in addition better general characteristics. In the literature, the signaling theory is
focusing on the signals every participant of an economy sends to others. The roots of
this signaling theory can be found in the work of Spence (1973). He describes how good
applicants for a job try to set themselves apart from inferior applicants. They use costly
certificates as a signal, i.e. a degree. This fundamental work initiated a huge amount of
related work using a signaling framework in modeling all kinds of economic relations.
The key concept of the signaling theory is information asymmetry between two types
of market participants. The signal sender has valuable insider information, which could
change the basis for decision-making of the receiver. The signal can contain a clue about
the sending person itself (Spence 1973), a good (Kirmani and Rao 2000) or a company
(Ross 1977) for example. The receiver as an outsider does not have this information,
but would find it useful for his decision. With the signal from the sender the receiver
can draw conclusions about the private information, but some uncertainty remains.
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For more information about the developement and concept of the signaling theory, see
Connelly, Certo, Ireland and Reutzel 2011.
Attending a university does not guarantee a degree. In all branches there is a positive
drop-out rate. For a university it would be easy to lower this rate, it just needs to lower
the standard. This is called grade inflation. Generally, one speaks of grade inflation,
when good grades are granted for less performance over time. When searching for the
cause of this trend, it is often assumed that grade inflation is costless for the university.
Grades are seen as a kind of a cheap talk. And since awarding good grades is costless
for an individual school and additionally has the advantage of attracting students, and
thereby generating more tuition, it seems that grade inflation is unavoidable. But in fact,
when people are attracted by the expectation of good grades for an average performance,
it is already generally known that this institution inflates grades, which in the next step
has negative impact on the university’s reputation, and finally have repercussions on
the labor market.
In the model introduced in chapter 3 the amount of students, and how many of them
are good is given exogenously. In the signaling game of Chan, Hao and Suen (2007), the
school sends a signal to the labor market about its amount of good students in terms of
the amount of As awarded. This amount of As does not correspond to the amount of
good students, when grades are inflated or deflated. The labor market will pay a wage
corresponding to the expected average performance to the students. In case of a low
endowment of good students, the school needs to trade off between the higher wage of
good students with an A, when grading honestly, and the lower wage of (good and a
part of the mediocre) students who received an A, when inflating grades.
The result from Chan, Hao and Suen (2007) is, that honest grading is never reasonable.
We show that this result can be traced back to the layout of the game, where grade
inflation has no influence on the reputation of the school. We extended the model to
have a second cohort of students. These students will appear in the game when the
grading policy of the school is already generally known and therefore will be employed
8
when the labor market already knows about the grading policy of the school, which
we call reputation of the school. Of course the size of this cohort crucially drives the
findings. Having a larger second cohort, the impact on reputation is higher. The chapter
3 proves that including reputation endogenously reduces grade inflation, and honest
grading can also lead to a reasonable equilibrium.
Policy makers who are chasing for the noble goal to give everybody the affordable
chance to attend a university, fight against grade inflation and stand for equality of
opportunity, must think of the institutional question of how schools should handle
unequally abled students. Many countries, like Germany, implement early tracking and
therefore separate students into different ability tracks at a very early state. Other
countries, like the US, try to keep all kinds of students together, tracking in individual
subjects, at the most. Does it help mediocre students to be taught together with good
students? Are good students hampered?
Chapter 4 deals with the question whether unequally abled students should be placed
in one class or should be taught separately and is based on the discussion paper (Ehlers
and Schwager 2016a), another joint work of Robert Schwager and myself. We step
back from signaling theory and sketch a simple model with basic economic behavioral
assumptions, generally based on the idea of Costrell (1994). Our model cancels out the
aspect of different performance, depending on the ability of the teacher (e.g. Rivkin,
Hanushek and Kain 2005). We introduce a two dimensional performance measure. One
dimension measures the ability from previous learning and the other one measures
the eagerness for learning and ability to quickly understand new contexts. In the first
years in school the endowment of previous knowledge can also be seen as a kind of
socioeconomic background. The model we introduce focuses on teachers’ demand or
standard and the performance reaction of the students. We state that tracked classes
are always better off in this aspect compared to mixed classes or comprehensive school,
when all actors share the same objective function, since the teacher can individually set
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an optimal demand. The crucial point here is the assumption that teacher and students
take effort costs into account, while parents, or at least society and research, do not.
Our main finding is that in the comprehensive school the measured performance
of the less able students can increase, even if there are no direct synergy effects from
teaching different students together. This arises because the comprehensive school sets a
compromise standard, which exceeds the standard from the low ability track. Moreover,
if students with lower initial ability have higher eagerness to learn, merging classes will
increase average performance. And this, in turn, could lead to the impression that
comprehensive schools help low ability students, while they are in fact overstrained and
mean performance increases.
As outlined, in this thesis I focus on topics in the area of economics of education.
We contribute three theoretical models to the existing literature. Our specific research
questions can be summarized as follows:
1. Do university tuition fees skew incentives for a degree?
2. Can status concerns explain the existence of tuition fees?
3. Can honest grading be reasonable in a signaling world with reputation?
4. If grade inflation exists in equilibrium, is the probability dependent on the impor-
tance of reputation?
5. Do comprehensive schools yield profit for low achieving students?
6. Is a tracked schooling system harmful or beneficial?
The first model, presented in chapter 2, will explain effects from tuition fees on enrollment
rates and answers question 1 and 2. The second one (see chapter 3), will focus on grade
inflation and the reputational effect and is assessing question 3 and 4, while the last
model, developed in chapter 4, will show the relationship of comprehensive school and
tracked school to student performance addressing question 5 and 6.
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2 University Graduation and its
Dependency on Family Wealth, Personal
Ability and Social Status
Author: Tim Ehlers
2.1 Introduction
There is no doubt that tuition fees have been the subject of heated debate in many
countries in recent years. If fees should be introduced, increased or abolished have
been especially considered. For instance, tuition fees have always been charged in the
US and range from 3,000 to 40,000 dollars per year. England allowed universities to
increase their tuition fees charged from the maximum of 1,000 pounds to 3,000 pounds
per year in 2005 (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2005)). The House of Commons
gave permission to increase the fees to up to 9,000 pounds starting in 2012: this was
accompanied by heavy student protests (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2010)). The
reform of federalism in Germany in 2006 led to several readjustments in the distribution
of the authority between the states and the federal government. The authority for
education was largely shifted to the individual states. Accordingly, seven German states
introduced tuition fees in this move. However, in the meantime all of them have returned
to a free system, at least for the first degree.
By charging tuition fees, the number of students may decline, leading to a higher
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reputation of the university degree. Huebner (2012) shows a small but significant
reduction in the enrollment rates of seven German states after the introduction of a
1,000 Euro fee per year. The present chapter assumes the scarcity of students as the
basis for the improvement of the status obtainable by graduation. As a result of this
assumption, it may well be that not only the more gifted students but also the persons of
means could enjoy high reputation by an enforced reduction of the number of students.
The richer people vote for a tuition fee, even though this does not improve the quality
of education, in order to archive this.
As opposed to Heckman (1976) who introduced a model in which investment in
human capital results in better allocation of leisure, and thus increasing “private” utility,
the present chapter introduces a model that describes an independent non-monetary
utility increase, making people more inclined to study at university. Attaining a higher
academic degree is usually combined with higher reputation in everyday life and in
interaction with non academic people. The possible reasons for this higher reputation
are diverse. One could argue that an academic degree is not only a signal for high ability
but also stamina and other positive but hidden properties. The independent variable in
this model is the social status or the prestige being attained with a university degree.
Nonetheless, the model can also cover additional non-monetary factors, for example
an occupation fitting better to personal disposition and the joy of learning or enjoying
student’s life. For the model, it is not necessary to declare what the status is concretely.
The only important fact is a non-monetary influence on utility by graduating.
Within the controversial debate for and against tuition fees, people in favor of the fees
often mention the raised quality as benefit to the students because the university has
more money available for improving study conditions. Schwager (2008) presents a model
in which solely the state runs universities. The state chooses the quality with a trade-off
between the value of local immobile students and the cost of running the universities.
The higher the tuition the lower the state’s net costs to manage the universities. This
rule ends when the number of enrolled students decreases too much. This chapter does
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not take the quality effect into account to simplify the model. Since all students would
more or less benefit from better study conditions, this would only likely shift the opinion
of the more able students towards higher fees.
Another model, presented by Kemnitz (2010), deals with the decision to study or
not to study and describes the utility function as being dependent on lifetime income.
This model deals with the abolition of the ban on tuition fees. The author assumes a
relationship between the quality effect for higher education and the amount of tuition
fees.
Gary-Bobo and Trannoy (2008) present a signaling model in which universities are
social surplus maximizers or profit maximizers. One would presume universities as social
surplus maximizers, when assuming a welfare state and universities driven by the state.
The students’ decision to study depends on their wage surplus from studying, which in
turn depends on their intellectual ability.
From social planers’ point of view, there are two mechanisms for selecting students:
exams and fees. Del Rey (2009) developed a model showing that if there is only a state
university, the social surplus maximizing planer would choose exams over fees. Del Rey
(2009) also shows that with competing private and state universities with perfect credit
market, the optimal fees could be positive.
People maximize their own utility by maximizing their lifetime income with subtracted
costs of study (Schultz (1961)). In other words, the young people estimate the benefits
and efforts of “purchasing” a university degree. This is referred to as the investment
approach (Campbell and Siegel (1967)). The costs of study include the effort of passing
exams, but also different costs of living, books and opportunity costs in the form
of income loss during the years of study. In the end, the investment must raise the
individual utility compared to the decision not to study. However, this utility differs
between richer and poorer families. Rich people would value the effort to study higher
than poor people would and they value the utility loss of paying tuition fees lower than
poor people would do.
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Becker (1975) developed a detailed theory about human capital investment with
costs and returns. The model in this chapter simplifies the details by summarizing the
variables for costs and earnings in a single variable.
Costs include tuition fees for attending university. This chapter focuses on these
tuition fees. It introduces a model which may help to explain a possible incentive of
some classes within the society to impose a levy on the attendance of universities, fixing
the fees at a level as high as possible. The assumption is that richer people are more
interested in obtaining a high social status and therefore in raising their utility by
obtaining prestige, on the other hand poor people are firstly concerned in extending
their finances.
2.2 The model
In the model each student or non-student has a family, but no siblings or children. Each
family has accumulated wealth of an individual value w. The student’s utility consists
of two variables: the first is the wage or income y he gets during his lifetime including w
(this can be interpreted as income through inheritance) and the second one is called the
social status or prestige s. This variable adopts two values: 0 if the person doesn’t study
and a positive value when the person graduates (to study and fail is not an option). A
student i has an individual utility function:
Ui = U(yi, si).
A student may value these two variables (y, s) in different ways. The assumption is
that the assessment depends on family’s wealth. As stated before, this wealth (w) is
included in the lifetime income y. The higher the lifetime income, the more the student
will value the benefit of the status. The poorer the family, the more the person will
value the higher income. Therefore, the utility of any student can be expressed as a
function dependent on y and s [U(y, s)] as shown in Figure 2.1. The assumptions are
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∂2U(y,s)
∂y∂s > 0 and
∂2U(y,s)
∂y2 < 0. However, as we will see later, the results still hold, if we
relax the first assumption to ∂
2U(y,s)






Figure 2.1: The utility U as a function of y (income including wealth) with and without
a fixed value of the social status s; ∂
2U(y,s)
∂y∂s > 0.
For the years of study, all students pay an amount p for studying, including tuition fees.
After studying, they may get a higher income α∆y compared to the income they would
earn without studying. The ∆y should be understood as the (minimum) difference
in lifetime income, discounted to a specific time. This chapter doesn’t concentrate
on interest rates or taxes, so ∆y will be treated as a fixed value. ∆y should also be
understood as a actuarial expectation value with decision under uncertainty. No student
can be sure to get a better paid job after studies. Nevertheless, since persons can have
different abilities, the later income also depends on the individual ability level α ∈ [1, =α].
The variable α can be interpreted as higher income through better grade, faster study,
and therefore a longer income period or just to receive a better paid job with good
results in the assessment center. The utility function for any student is a function given
by y = w + α∆y − p and the non-monetary value s:
U = U(w + α∆y − p, s). (2.1)
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Any person not studying has a utility given by:
U = U(w, 0). (2.2)
2.3 Society divided into students and non-students
by wealth and ability
There is a continuum of students ordered by wealth and ability. The number of stu-





w is the richest characteristic and =α is the most able charac-
teristic in society.
Proposition 2.1 If there are individuals not studying at a given ability α, and if not all
individuals with this ability reject studying, there is one w̃ where for a given p, all young
people sort themselves into two groups such that one group with the size
∫ w̃
0 f(w,α)dw
are persons not studying. The other group with size
∫ =w
w̃ f(w,α)dw are students.
Proof. The cross-derivative ∂
2U(y,s)
∂y∂s ≥ 0 must hold (richer people have the same or
higher marginal utility from social status, see Figure 2.1 showing ∂
2U(y,s)
∂y∂s > 0), so that
there is one threshold dividing the persons by wealth w. Firstly, consider a student
indifferent between studying and not studying. His wealth is w = w̃. Therefore, the
utility shown below must hold:
U(w̃ + α∆y − p, s) = U(w̃, 0). (2.3)
Now, consider a student whose wealth is above the threshold, w > w̃. The utility is
U(w + α∆y − p, s) = U(w̃ + α∆y − p, s) +
∫ w
w̃




if he studies and






if he doesn’t. The difference in the utilities is:
U(w + α∆y − p, s)− U(w, 0)










The first two terms on the right hand side are equal because a person with w = w̃ is
indifferent between studying and not studying (see (2.3)). Therefore,


















The marginal utility of money (y) decreases, ∂
2U(y,s)
∂y2 < 0 and α∆y < p (otherwise the
indifference in (2.3) would not hold):






Comparing (2.5) and (2.6) with the inner square bracket of (2.4) shows that








and hence (2.4)> 0 for all y ∈ (w̃, w]. So any student with w > w̃ will study. By
analogous argument, one can conclude that all individuals with w < w̃ choose not to
study.
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w̃w̃ + α∆y − p
α∆y − p
y
Figure 2.2: The utility after study decision below w̃ and above.
Figure 2.2 shows the functions U(w, 0) and U(w + α∆y − p, s). All individuals with
w < w̃ choose not to study and get the utility of U(w, 0). For a given α∆y − p < 0,
there is one indifferent person with w = w̃ getting the same utility on both functions:
U(w̃, 0) = U(w̃ + α∆y − p, s). All people with w > w̃ are getting a higher utility on the
function U(w + α∆y − p, s) than on the function U(w, 0).
With α, all investigated persons are assumed to have the same intellectual ability,
but the society consists of persons with different abilities, α ∈ [1, =α]. The indifferent
person must have an α = α̃, so that p is higher than α̃∆y. If α̃∆y is higher or equal p,
there will be no one indifferent, because as per definition, the social status is positive
and anybody with this intellectual ability would study independently of his monetary
background (see fig. 2.2; α∆y − p < 0).
If there are individuals not studying at a given wealth w, and if not all the individuals
with this wealth reject studying, there will also be one α̃, where for a given p, all young
people sort themselves into two groups, where the more able people choose to study.
Proposition 2.2 There is a bijective relation between α̃ and w̃. This function, ŵ(α)
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or α̂(w), has a negative slope, where 0 < w < =w and 1 < α < =α:
ŵ(α) =

w̃(α) if w̃(α) > 0, w̃(α) < =w
=
w if w̃(α) > =w




α̃(w) if α̃(w) > 0, α̃(w) < =α
=
α if α̃(w) > =α
0 if α̃(w) < 1.
(2.9)
Proof. The generalized indifference condition from (2.3) (α ≡ α̃) defines an implicit











The denominator of (2.10) is positive, because money always increases utility and
∆y without the costs of the studies are also positive. The numerator is also positive
if α̃∆y − p < 0. This means that in the normal case, with existence of an indifferent
person, (2.10)< 0. So there is an indifference function α̂(w) with a negative slope. The
inverse function ŵ(α) can be proven analogous.
This bijective function is shown in figure 2.3(a) as α̂(w).
2.4 Status depends on the quantity of graduates
The status (s) was treated as a fixed positive value until now. Now, assume that s
depends on the number of graduates (l). The more graduates the economy has, the
less prestige one will derive from graduating. This direct relation is denoted by S(l),
S′(l) < 0. From the individuals’ point of view, we get the opposite relation. When s
























(c) The same reaction like 2.3(b),
but the richest indifferent person is
now better off after rasing p. The
horizontally hatched area must be
bigger than the vertically hatched
area.
Figure 2.3: The students/non-students separating function, dependent on α and w. The
area above the line shows the share of students in society. The area below
represents the share of non-students.
The relation is expressed by l(SU ), or for better comparison the inverse of l(SU ), SU (l).
In the static equilibrium, all people with specific α and w, which in combination leads





ŵ(α) f(w,α)dwdα, where ŵ(α) is the students/non-students separating function
(2.8), see also figure 2.3(a).
In Figure 2.4(a), these static equilibrium relations are shown. For the high status s′
a specific low w̃ will be established with the corresponding high number of students
l′. However, this number of students will establish the low status s′′ in society. In
equilibrium, s∗ and l∗ will be established.
For the analysis of the simultaneous equilibrium, two equations must hold:
l − L(s, p) = 0, (2.11)
s− S(l) = 0. (2.12)




ŵ(α) f(w,α)dwdα, corresponding to the SU (l) function.










(a) Status s established by the society (S(l))
and an indirect function (SU (l)), showing how












(b) Scrolling SU (l) by raising p. A new
equilibrium at (l∗′, s∗′) is established.
Figure 2.4: Dependencies between social status, number of graduates and changing p.
Where status and number of students are derived endogenously within a
simultaneous equilibrium.





















Proposition 2.3 A raise in price will lead to a higher status in equilibrium and vice
versa. In other words ds
∗(p)
dp > 0.
Proof. The crucial parts are the changes in L(s, p) with respect to s and p. Firstly,










with A(α, ŵ(α, s, p)) =
∫ =w
ŵ(α,s,p) f(w,α)dw, the share of students for a given α. From




∂s , we derive:
∂A
∂s
= −f(ŵ(α, s, p), α)∂ŵ(α, s, p)
∂s
. (2.15)











If ŵ = 0, the reasons are there is no indifferent person w̃ at this α (all people having














if ŵ = w̃
0 if ŵ = 0, or ŵ = =w.
(2.17)














Here α0(s, p) is that α, where the indifferent person is just not existent anymore
(ŵ(α, s, p) = 0).
∂L














Now we can value the sign of (2.13). Since ∂L∂p < 0 and
∂S
∂l < 0, the numerator is
positive. The denominator is also positive since ∂L∂s > 0 and
∂S
∂l < 0. This means that if
p rises, the amount of students must decline, and therefore s, in equilibrium, is rising.
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2.5 Who is in favor of tuition fees?
When p is not given exogenously, but can be set, for example by majority vote, the
question arises: who could have an interest in raising or lowering p? In other words,
who is a loser and who is a winner when p is increased? The utility function is redefined
as being dependent on w, α and p, where equilibrium status is endogenously determined
by p according to (2.11) and (2.12).
V (w,α, p) ≡ U(w + α∆y − p, s∗(p)). (2.20)
Differentiating V (w,α, p) with respect to p gives:
∂V
∂p
= −∂U(w + α∆y − p, s
∗(p))
∂y






The first part of the equation is the direct effect on utility for lowering the wealth or
for raising fees. The second term is the effect on utility for the indirect rise of status




















The higher w, the lower the income effect ∂U(w+α∆y−p,s
∗(p))
∂y and the higher the effect
on utility by rising status. In the upper part of the old indifference line (Figure 2.3(a)),
the former indifferent person would be a loser in raising p, if he would have studied.
However, since he was indifferent, he can switch to no-study. If the crowding out effect
for the poorer people is high enough, situation shown in Figure 2.3(c) can occur. Then,
the richer indifferent persons would win in rising p.
In the situation in Figure 2.3(b), there are five groups in society now. The group of
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people who are poorer than w̃(α) don’t care about the fees. They don’t study anyway
and don’t win or lose when p rises. The second group ranges from w̃(α) to the indifference
point of the new indifference function. They become losers when p increases. They
change their decision for study. They would have studied before the rise and will now
decline to study. They lose utility by the amount of U(w + α∆y − po, so∗(p))− U(w, 0)
(o = old value). The third group still studies, but the price-effect is higher than the
status effect (see (2.21), ∂V∂po < 0). The fourth group had an incentive to raise p, but not
as much as it has been raised (∂V∂p < 0 <
∂V
∂po ). They are now against further raising of
the fees. The fifth group win after the raise: their price-effect is lower than the gain on
rising status.
In the situation in Figure 2.3(c), with α > α′, we have the same five groups. For
the indifferent person with α = α′, the status effect exactly cancels the price effect out.
However, this does not mean that there is no winner in increasing p. Since the status is
higher than before, the utility function is steeper now. All people with w(α′) > w̃(α′)
are winners in raising p. On this level of α, there are no losers in raising p: this applies
for all α ≤ α′. This means that in the situation in Figure 2.3(c), there is a big winning
group when p is raised. This group includes all students with α ≤ α′, but also a number
of students with α > α′ with higher wealth.
Nonetheless, even if the normal reaction (Figure 2.3(b)) occurs, there can be a group
in the right region (the rich part of society) gaining more from higher status than losing
from higher prices for university. If there exists such a group, then how big it is depends
on the disparity of wealth in the society.
2.6 Example
For the example, I choose an additive separable utility function:
U(y, s) = ln(y + 1) + ln(s+ 1), (2.22)
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Figure 2.5: Individual utility, dependent on y, with s = 1 (U(y, s) = ln(y + 1) + ln(2)
and U(y, 0) = ln(y + 1)).
∂2U
∂2y




The individual’s income when studing equals:
y = w + α∆y − p. (2.25)
The individual’s income without the decision to study is denoted by:
y = w. (2.26)
For an individual in an economy with s = 1, the utility functions dependent on y and
can be found in Figure 2.5. Since I modeled an additive separable utility function, there
is just a shift and no rotation between the function to study and not to study. With
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presumable non negative and non zero utilities, the indifference can be expressed as:
ln(w̃ + α∆y − p+ 1) + ln(s+ 1) = ln(w̃ + 1),
(w̃ + α∆y − p+ 1)(s+ 1) = w̃ + 1,
(2.27)
w̃(α) = (α∆y − p)(s+ 1)
s
− 1. (2.28)








Figure 2.6: Status dependent on the price to study, ∆y = 3, 1 ≤ α ≤ 3, 0 ≤ w ≤ 100.
In the example I assume α between 1 and 3 and w between 0 and 100. For simplicity,
I assume an uniform distribution over all α and w. Hence, the social functions can be
expressed as follows:







L(s) = 1− s. (2.30)
The income difference ∆y is set to 3. There is a status function dependent on the
price to study (Figure 2.6). The status is 0 until the price raises above 3, because with
p ≤ 3 even the most unable person would gain (or at least does not lose) from studying
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independently of his family wealth.







(a) Indifference line with price for
study p = 10.










(b) Pro and contra for a price
raise at p = 10.











(c) Groups in society, raising the
price from p = 10 to p = 11.
Figure 2.7: Indifference line to study (Figure 2.7(a)). Indifference line for a price change
(∂V∂p ) with resulting pro and contra groups for raising prices (Figure 2.7(b)).
Groups in society, raising p from 10 to 11 (Figure 2.7(c)).
If we set the price level for study to 10, we can find the indifferent persons to study
and to changing prices (Figure 2.7). In Figure 2.7(a) the indifference line for studying
is shown. Moreover, Figure 2.7(b) shows the indifference line for a price change. This
leads to three groups voting for at least an infinitesimally small change in price. If there
is a plan to change the price from 10 to 11, the already mentioned (see section 2.5) five
groups will appear (Figure 2.7(c)).
In this example, at p = 10 the group being in favor of raising prices to p = 11 is
quite large (group 5 in Figure 2.7(c)). Since group 1 is indifferent, there would be a
good chance that the median voter is in favor of raising the price, but this is not clear.
Although group 1 is indifferent, they are more likely to be against the raise in the hope
of being able to lower the price some when later.
On the other hand, the higher the price, the smaller this group will be. Finally, when
p is high enough, only the smartest and richest upper right corner group will be in favor
of raising the price.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, a model is presented to explain a possible incentive for the richer and/or
the more able subset of a society to raise tuition fees, even if there is no direct utility such
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as better study conditions or better equipment. The fundamental idea is a non-monetary
utility influence through “social status” which increases if fewer people decide to study.
The model is kept as simple as possible. Hence, the quality effect of tuition is not
considered to concentrate on the influence of the status effect. If one takes into account
a possible uncertainty for the poor about future income and the fear of running into
debt, the presented crowding out effect could be even stronger.
Another reason why the effect could be stronger than demonstrated is because even if
utility of life would increase by attending university, some might refrain from enrolling
due to uncertainty and incorrect assessment of opportunities in future.
Moreover, this chapter does not say anything about the political influence and the
size of the group in favor of the tuition fees. This group will not likely be large enough
to raise the tuition markedly, when thinking about a median voter situation. However,
if there is no popular vote for the fees, the influence of the richer group in the form of
representatives could be even higher.
Social planners must be aware that charging tuition fees will prevent some people
from attaining universities, namely the poor and less able people. The social problem
results when the poorer do not enroll solely due to a high utility value loss if they had
paid the tuition fees.
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Abstract
When students receive better grades without any corresponding increase in ability, this is
called grade inflation. Conventional wisdom says that such grade inflation is unavoidable
since it is essentially costless to award good grades. In this article, we point out an
effect driving into the opposite direction: Grade inflation is not actually costless, since it
has an impact on future cohorts of graduates, or, put differently, by grading honestly, a
school can build up reputation. Introducing a concern for reputation into an established
signalling model of grading, we show that this mechanism reduces or even avoids grade
inflation.
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4 Academic Achievement and Tracking – A
Theory Based on Grading Standards
Authors: Tim Ehlers and Robert Schwager
4.1 Introduction
A major controversy in education policy concerns whether students should be taught in
comprehensive schools or whether classes should be tracked according to ability. For
example, in Germany the results of the first PISA tests raised a debate about making
the school system more comprehensive. Such a policy is motivated by the idea that
mixing good and mediocre students improves the performance of mediocre students
without harming the good students too much. This reasoning is largely supported by
empirical research which often finds that tracking, or the ability composition of classes,
affect the performance of individual students.
While such peer group effects seem to be well documented empirically, the mechanism
driving them is rarely discussed. A possible explanation states that good students help
mediocre colleagues to pass the exam and in addition learn by explaining the subject.
Formally this can be modeled by a learning production function which depends on the
average ability in class like in Arnott and Rowse (1987) and in Epple, Newlon and
Romano (2002). While we do not question the relevance of this explanation, in this
chapter we present a complementary theory which is based on the schools’ grading
policy. We show that the incentives created by grading standards alone can explain
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many empirical results on tracking without refering to any direct impact of classmates’
ability on individual performance.
The idea of the peer goup effect goes back to the 1970’s where this effect was first
analyzed in the US. In this decade, for example Summers and Wolfe (1977) empirically
analyzed the performance of students from the Philadelphia school district. They came
to the conclusion that a high share of good students has a positive effect on the mediocre
students, while the good students are not harmed. On the other hand the performance
of both types is reduced if the share of mediocre students is too high. Summers and
Wolfe conclude that in this case both mediocre and good students do not deploy their
full potential.
Following up on this early contribution, a large literature has emerged which empiri-
cally analyzes peer group effects and the impact of tracking on educational outcomes.
Surveys of this literature are provided by Meier and Schütz (2008) and Brunello and
Checchi (2007). This research investigates the impact of tracking on average academic
performance and on performance of students with different abilities. The latter question
is linked to equality of opportunity, in the sense that academic achievement should not
depend on the social background. This is especially relevant in the case of early tracking,
since family background is likely to strongly influence the ability in the first years of
schooling.
In this line of research Argys, Rees and Brewer (1996) find that the abolishment
of tracking in the US would result in a large increase in performance of students in
low ability classes, but on the other hand would decrease performance of students in
high achieving classes. Similarly Woessmann (2010) concludes that less tracking leads
to more equality of opportunity. In addition, Hanushek and Wößmann (2006) find a
tendency that early tracking reduces average performance, but this cannot be found
in all investigated countries. Waldinger (2006) also comes to the conclusion that early
tracking of students with non-academic family background results in low academic
achievement. He argues that the difference in achievement based on family background
31
is already present before tracking takes place. Tracking does not reinforce this difference,
but comprehensive schooling would reduce it.
Several contributions come to somewhat different conclusions, suggesting positive
effects of tracking. Figlio and Page (2002) find no evidence that low ability students are
harmed in a tracked environment, but that they may, in contrast, gain in a tracked class.
The work by Kim, Lee and Lee (2008) uses data from South Korea, where tracking
takes place in about half of the existing schools. Their main result states that tracking
raises average achievement. It helps students above median ability and does not lower
the achievement of students below it. Another study which does not yield negative
effects of tracking is provided by Betts and Shkolnik (2000). According to their results,
tracking does not significantly change achievement of low ability students. It has a small
negative effect on students with moderate ability and a small positive effect on high
ability students, which cancel out in average performance.
Summing up, the empirical literature agrees more or less that the family background
plays a major role for academic achievement. This is reinforced by tracking, at least
when tracking occurs early. Most studies also conclude that equality of opportunity is
promoted by comprehensive schooling, in the sense that the achievement gap between
students of different abilities or backgrounds is narrowed. In contrast, there does not
seem to be clear evidence on whether average achievement rises or falls when students
are tracked.
In this chapter we provide a simple model which can account for these facts. In
the model there are two types of students distinguished by ability. These students are
taught either in tracked classes or in a comprehensive school. The instrument of the
school is the graduation standard, which is the level of performance required to pass the
exam. In setting the standard, the school trades off wages of graduates, which rise in
the standard, against effort costs required to meet a more demanding standard.
We consider two different dimensions of ability. The first dimension represents the
endowment a student starts with. This endowment is the ability a student has when
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the tracking decision is taken. It results from previous learning, which is determined by
family background and former schooling. Clearly, the earlier tracking occurs, the more
relevant is the family background. We assume that students can reach an academic
performance corresponding to the endowment without effort cost.
The second dimension of ability is the eagerness to learn or to improve personal
achievement. This is the student’s potential a teacher can work with. This dimension
determines how hard is is for students to raise performance beyond their initial ability.
Importantly, we do not exclude the case where students with low initial endowment
have high eagerness to learn or vice versa.
We distinguish between the objective function of the student or teacher, and the
objective the parents or society may have. While the latter only care for academic
performance, the student incurs costs in terms of stress. We assume that the teacher
takes these costs into account when setting the standard, implying that he or she chooses
a standard below the standard preferred by society. This modeling is motivated by the
emphasis which policy makers and researchers put on performance measuring tests like
PISA and TIMMS, which disregard effort costs.
In this framework we characterize the standards chosen by tracked schools and by a
comprehensive school, and compare the resulting academic achievements of both types
of students. We show that it depends on the parameters whether students with lower
initial endowment gain from a comprehensive school. In essence this occurs when their
eagerness to learn is not too different from the eagerness of students with high initial
endowment. In this case also the achievement gap between both types declines when
classes are merged. This arises because in a comprehensive school the teacher is forced
to set the standard as a compromise. This pushes lower ability students to higher
achievement at the cost of stressing them excessively.
In a further result we compare average academic performance in the tracked and
comprehensive school system. In line with the empirical literature, both systems may
dominate in that respect. The average performance in the comprehensive system is
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higher if students with lower initial endowment have higher eagerness to learn. In this
case the tracked system does not make full use of the learning potential of students with
low initial endowment, on which tracking is based. In contrast, if students with low
initial endowment also have lower eagerness to learn, average performance goes down
when classes are merged.
It is worth noting that these results crucially depend on the two specific elements of
our model. First, when all students have the same eagerness to learn and hence differ
only in one dimension of ability, then a compromise standard at the comprehensive
school necessarily leads to the same average performance as the separate standards of
tracked schools. Second, in our model non-tracking will always be dominated by tracking
if teachers and society share the same objective function. In the comprehensive school
a unique standard must be chosen and one degree of freedom is given up. Therefore
maximization of either average performance or welfare is carried out under an additional
restriction in the comprehensive school, and a tracked school system is always preferable.
This chapter contributes to the theory of grading, initiated by Costrell (1994) and
Betts (1998). We build upon the traditional model of Costrell, where students weigh
the advantage of a degree against the disadvantage of exerting sufficient effort to pass
the standard which is set by the teacher. Costrell (1997) puts his model into the
context of central or decentralized standards. Since a centralized standard is uniform
and decentralized standards are specific, this setting is similar to a comparison of
untracked and tracked school systems. In addition Costrell’s model, similarly to ours,
allows for differences in abilities among schools. However, the focus of his analysis is
different from ours. His main issue is that individual schools can free-ride on the tough
standards of other schools in the case where employers can only observe the average
achievement of graduates from all schools. In contrast we focus on tracking according
to ability. Moreover, as stressed above, our model extends Costrell’s setup by assuming
two dimensions of ability and by replacing the ever positive marginal costs of learning
by the idea that a certain performance level can be reached without costs.
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4.2 The model
There are two types of students i ∈ {l;h} which differ in ability. We consider two
dimensions of ability. The first dimension, which we label endowment or initial ability,
represents the level of performance a student can achieve without feeling stressed. We
assume that students actually like to think, solve problems, and participate in class and
that they feel bored if courses do not challenge them enough. Each individual of type i
has the same initial endowment γi={l;h}. We assume γl < γh, so that students of type l
have lower endowment than students of type h. To interpret the nature of differences
in the initial endowment, we observe that the level of performance achievable without
feeling stressed most likely depends on previous learning. Moreover, it is natural to
think that γi is largely determined by the upbringing and the parental background of
students, as mentioned in the introduction.
The second dimension of ability, labeled ai for type i, expresses the ease of learning.
This parameter measures how much stress a student feels if he or she pushes performance
beyond his or her initial ability γi. We can interpret ai as the individual intellectual
capacity and motivation of the student. Since a student with a low academic background
can well be highly motivated or intelligent, we allow for the case al > ah. This describes
the situation where students of type l have low initial endowment of ability but high
eagerness and capacity to learn.
Depending on both dimensions of ability a student has costs ci to achieve a certain




(ei − γi)2 . (4.1)
Here the inverse of ai enters the marginal cost of learning. There is a minimum at
ei = γi, where costs are zero. At this point the student’s academic performance is just
his or her initial ability. The cost function, shown in figure 4.1, represents the idea that








Figure 4.1: Cost as a function of effort for a student of type i. When effort equals initial
ability γi, marginal cost of effort is zero.
We now turn to the examination and the labor market. We start in this section by
analyzing the case where students are taught in classes tracked according to type. The
school or the teacher set a standard si which is measured in the same units as the level of
education ei. The level of personal education must be at least as high as the standard of
the school in order to pass the final exam and graduate. The students decide to become
graduates or not and, conditional on this, which academic performance to achieve. This
decision is based on the cost of effort and the wages for non-graduates w0i and graduates
w1i. This formulation assumes that employers observe a student’s type i and whether
he or she graduated or not. However, the individual performance ei is unknown to the
employer and therefore does not enter the wage.
Conditional on the decision to pass the exam or not, the student chooses performance




{w1i − ci(ei)|ei ≥ si} ⇒
 ei = si if si ≥ γiei = γi if si < γi
u0i = max
ei
{w0i − ci(ei)} ⇒ ei = γi .
(4.2)
Anticipating this choice, a student graduates if u1i ≥ u0i. We assume that students
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expect w1i ≥ w0i. One can see from equation (4.4) below that this expectation is
confirmed in equilibrium. The graduation choice is then given by:
max{u0i;u1i} =

u1i if si < γi
u1i if w1i − ci(si)− w0i ≥ 0 and si ≥ γi
u0i if w1i − ci(si)− w0i < 0 and si ≥ γi .
(4.3)
In equilibrium, the wage after passing the exam w1i must be equal to the expected
productivity of graduates of class i. We normalize productivity to be measured in
the same units as academic performance. Therefore w1i equals the education level of
graduates of class i. In the same way the wage w0i is given by the academic performance
of non-graduates. From equation (4.2) we have:
w0i = γi ⇒ no exam
w1i = max{si; γi} ⇒ exam .
(4.4)
We now turn to the choice of standard si by the teacher. The teacher maximizes
utility of all students. Thus, we assume that the teacher cares about the disutility of
learning of his or her students. Inserting (4.4) and (4.1) into (4.3) shows that in the
case where si ≥ γi, the student chooses to graduate if si − γi ≤ 2ai. Using this, (4.2)
and (4.4) in (4.3) shows that utility of all students of type i is given by:
Vi(si) =
 γi if si < γi or si − γi > 2aisi − 12ai (si − γi)2 if si ≥ γi and si − γi ≤ 2ai .






!= 0 ⇒ s∗i = ai + γi . (4.5)
The chosen standard reflects both dimensions of ability.
Comparing the two standards, the typical case is given by s∗h > s∗l , where h-students
37
enjoy an advantage compared to l-students in terms of total ability:
ah + γh > al + γl . (4.6)
In this case one can clearly label both types of students as l-low and h-high ability.
However we do not rule out the opposite case, where
ah + γh ≤ al + γl . (4.7)
Thus, we allow the learning capacity of l-students to be so much higher than the one
of h-students that it overcompensates the disadvantage of initial endowment of the
l-students.
4.3 Merging classes
The previous analysis dealt with separated classes i ∈ {l;h}. In contrast in this section
we consider the case where both classes can be mixed together in one comprehensive
school. We denote the share of h-students in the comprehensive school by 0 < d < 1.
The teacher sets a common standard s applying to all students in the mixed class. The
teacher’s objective function is the aggregate utility of all students, denoted by V (s). We
continue to assume that employers are able to observe the standard of the school and
the type of an applicant i. Therefore, for any given standard s, individual choices of
students are still determined by (4.2) and (4.3) and wages are still given by (4.4), where
si is replaced by s.
Depending on the standard, one of four constellations can occur. First, all students
choose a performance equal to their initial ability γi. We denote the value of the school’s
objective function in this case by Ṽ0. Since in this case every student of type i earns a
wage equal to γi and has no cost, it follows Ṽ0 = γl(1− d) + γhd. This constellation will
not occur in equilibrium.
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Second, only for the l-students the standard is binding, while the h-students choose
performance γh. Using the wage (4.4) and the cost function (4.1), aggregate utility in
this case is Ṽl(s) =
[
s− 12al (s− γl)
2
]
(1− d) + γhd.
Third, both types of students choose to graduate and have to incur effort costs to do
so. Then performance of students of both types just meets the standard s. Hence, the
school’s objective is Ṽ (s) =
[









Fourth, l-students perform at their initial ability γl, while h-students meet the standard.
This yields the objective function Ṽh(s) = γl(1− d) +
[
















(a) Parameter: d = 0.5,
γh = 0.7, γl = 0.1,
ah = 0.3, al = 0.4












(b) Parameter: d = 0.5,
γh = 0.7, γl = 0.3,
ah = 0.3, al = 0.25













(c) Parameter: d = 0.5,
γh = 0.7, γl = 0.3,
ah = 0.3, al = 0.4
Figure 4.2: The objective function of the comprehensive school V (s). Ṽh (Ṽl) describes
the value of the schools objective, if one assumes that h(l)-students exert
effort to pass the exam and l(h)-students choose the effort level γl (γh). V
is the upper envelope of Ṽ , Ṽl and Ṽh.
Which one of these four cases applies depends on the parameter constellation. This
leads to the following definition of V (s) with seven branches defined by parameter




Ṽ0 [1] if s ≤ γl,h
Ṽ0 [2] if s ≤ γh; s > γl; s− γl > 2al
Ṽl(s) [3] if s ≤ γh; s > γl; s− γl ≤ 2al
Ṽ (s) [4] if s > γl,h; s− γl ≤ 2al; s− γh ≤ 2ah
Ṽh(s) [5] if s > γl,h; s− γl > 2al; s− γh ≤ 2ah
Ṽl(s) [6] if s > γl,h; s− γl ≤ 2al; s− γh > 2ah
Ṽ0 [7] if s > γl,h; s− γl > 2al; s− γh > 2ah
(4.8)
In the first branch [1] the standard is too low to bind anybody, so all students just
perform at the initial endowment. In the next branch [2] outcome is the same, but
the standard is above the maximal standard the l-students are willing to satisfy and
u1l < u0l. h-students still graduate without effort cost. Branch [3] represents the
situation where the l-students graduate by just meeting the standard whereas h-students
still graduate with level γh. On branch [4], the standard is high enough to be binding
also for h-students. Branches [5] and [6] differ depending on which group first refuses to
satisfy the high standard and falls back to initial ability. In branch [5] this is true for
the l-students and in branch [6] for the h-students. The last branch [7] shows a standard
higher than anybody will accept to meet.
Notice that the branches [3]-[6] of the expression V (s) are strictly concave. Moreover,
observe that Ṽl and Ṽh are affine transformations of the objective functions Vl and Vh
of the separated classes: Ṽl(s) = (1 − d)Vl(s) + dγh and Ṽh(s) = dVh(s) + (1 − d)γl.
Consequently in the branches [3], [5], and [6], where one of these functions applies, the


















From this first order condition of Ṽ , we obtain:
s∗ = alah + dalah + γhγl − dahγl
ah(1− d) + ald
= dal
ah(1− d) + ald
s∗h +
(1− d)ah
ah(1− d) + ald
s∗l . (4.9)
The standard of a mixed class is a weighted average of the standards chosen in separated
classes. The weights combine the population shares d and (1 − d) with the ability
parameters ah and al.
Figure 4.2 shows the different branches of V . The sub-figures 4.2(a), 4.2(b) and 4.2(c)
are based on different parameter combinations, where the optimal standard is s∗l , s∗h
and s∗ respectively. We will now analyze in which branch of V the optimal standard
is located, that is, which of these three standards gives the highest welfare. Pairwise
comparison of the local maxima obtained by the three standards shows that
Ṽ (s∗) T Ṽl(s∗l ) ⇔ Fl(al, ah, γl, γh, d) T 0
Ṽ (s∗) T Ṽh(s∗h) ⇔ Fh(al, ah, γl, γh, d) S 0
Ṽh(s∗h) T Ṽl(s∗l ) ⇔ Flh(al, ah, d) S 0 ,
(4.10)
where
Fl(al, ah, γl, γh, d) = ah [al(2− d)− 2(1− d)(γh − γl)]− (1− d)(al − γh + γl)2
Fh(al, ah, γl, γh, d) = a2hd+ d(γh − γl)(γh − γl − 2al)− ah(al + ald− 2dγh + 2dγl)
Flh(al, ah, d) = al(1− d)− ahd .
These functions define boundaries between subsets of the parameter space. Depending
on the signs of the three functions Fl, Fh and Flh, there could be up to eight such
subsets. Two of these do not exist, however, since the three functions cannot be all
positive or all negative at the same time. For example, if Fh > 0 and Fl > 0, then
equations (4.10) imply Ṽh(s∗h) > Ṽ (s∗) > Ṽl(s∗l ), hence Flh < 0.
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l if Fl > 0 and Fh < 0
s∗l = al + γl if Fl < 0 and Flh > 0
s∗h = ah + γh if Fh > 0 and Flh < 0 .
(4.11)
Proof.
We need to consider all three possible optimalities and check if the needed constrains
from (4.8) are satisfied.
At first we consider s∗ is optimal.
We need to show that if Fl > 0 and Fh < 0 hold, s∗ satisfies the conditions given in
branch [4] of (4.8).
s∗ > γl is equivalent to al [ah(1− d) + ald] [ah + d(γh − γl)] > 0, which is satisfied in
any case.
s∗ > γh is equivalent to ah [ah(1− d) + ald] [(γh − γl)(1− d)− al] < 0, which reduces
to al > (γh−γl)(1−d). The inequality Fl > 0 is equivalent to ah [al(2− d)− 2(1− d)(γh − γl)] >
(1 − d)(al − γh + γl)2. This implies al(2 − d) − 2(1 − d)(γh − γl) > 0, which can be
transformed into al − (1− d)(γh − γl) > ald2 . From this al > (1− d)(γh − γl) and hence
s∗ > γh follows.
s∗ − γl ≤ 2al is, for al 6= 0, equivalent to al ≥ d(γh−γl)+ah(2d−1)2d ≡ Al(ah). Fh < 0 is
equivalent to al > d(ah+γh−γl)
2
ah(1+d)+2d(γh−γl) ≡ Bl(ah). We show that Bl(ah) ≥ Al(ah) so that
al > Bl(ah) implies al > Al(ah). To see this, observe that Bl(ah) ≥ Al(ah) is equivalent
to −ah(1− d)d[ah + d(γh − γl)] [ah + ahd+ 2d(γh − γl)] ≤ 0, which is true in any case.
s∗ − γh ≤ 2ah is, for ah 6= 0, equivalent to ah ≥ al(1−2d)−(1−d)(γh−γl)2(1−d) ≡ Ah(al).
Fl > 0 implies that al(2 − d) − 2(1 − d)(γh − γl) > 0. Hence Fl > 0 is equivalent
to ah > (1−d)(al−γh+γl)
2
al(2−d)−2(1−d)(γh−γl) ≡ Bh(al). We show that Bh(al) ≥ Ah(al) so that ah >
Bh(al) implies ah > Ah(al). The inequality Bh(al) ≥ Ah(al) is equivalent to al(1 −
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d)d [al(2− d)− 2(1− d)(γh − γl)] [al − (1− d)(γh − γl)] > 0. As shown in the proof of
s∗ > γh, we have al(2− d)− 2(1− d)(γh − γl) > 0 and al − (1− d)(γh − γl) > 0. Hence
Bh(al) > Ah(al) for all al > 0.
s∗l is optimal.
Now we need to show that if Fl < 0 and Flh > 0 hold, s∗l satisfies the conditions given
in branch [3] or [6] of (4.8). We distinguish two cases, depending on whether (4.6) or (4.7)
holds. In the first case, where ah+γh > al+γl, we show that branch [3] of (4.8) applies. In







Cl(ah). Observe that Cl(ah) < γh − γl is equivalent to 4(1 − d)d(γh − γl) > 0, which
is true. Hence we have al < Cl(ah) < γh − γl, which proves s∗l ≤ γh. The conditions
s∗l > γl and s∗l − γl ≤ 2al follow from s∗l = al + γl.
In the case ah + γh ≤ al + γl the branch [6] of (4.8) applies. The first two conditions
s∗l > γl and s∗l ≤ 2al + γl follow directly from s∗l = al + γl. We show that the condition
s∗l − γh > 2ah follows from Fl < 0. Inserting s∗l = al + γl, we can rewrite this condition
as ah < al+γl−γh2 ≡ Ch(al). Consider the denominator of Bh(al) defined above. From
ah − al < γl − γh we have al(2− d)− 2(1− d)(γh − γl) > al(2− d) + 2(1− d)(ah − al) =
ald + 2(1 − d)ah > 0. Therefore Fl < 0 is equivalent to ah < Bh(al). We show
that Bh(al) < Ch(al), so that ah < Bh(al) implies ah < Ch(al). The inequality
Bh(al) < Ch(al) is equivalent to [al(−2 + d) + 2(1− d)(γh − γl)] (al + γl − γh) < 0.
Since here al + γl − γh > ah > 0, this is equivalent to al(2− d)− 2(1− d)(γh − γl) > 0,
which we just have shown to be true.
s∗h is optimal.
Fh > 0 is equivalent to al < Bl(ah), where Bl(ah) is defined above. s∗h − γl > 2al
is equivalent to al < ah+γh−γl2 ≡ Dl(ah). We show that Bl(ah) < Dl(ah). Knowing
ah+ahd+2d(γh−γl) > 0 and d < 1, this is true. Hence al < Bl(ah) implies al < Dl(ah).
The conditions s∗h > γh and s∗h − γh ≤ 2ah follow from s∗h = ah + γh. 
From this proposition we can directly read the globally optimal standard. This is s∗
if the parameters are such that Fl > 0 and Fh < 0. If one of these inequalities is not
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satisfied, the optimal standard is s∗l or s∗h, depending on the sign of Flh.






















Figure 4.3: Parameter regions in ah − al-space with different optimal standards in the
comprehensive school, with d = 0.5, γl = 0.3 and γh = 0.7. The labels
Ṽ , Ṽl and Ṽh show in which branch of V the global maximum is located.
Below (on, above) the dotted line starting at (ah = 0; al = 0.4) one has
al + γl < (=, >)ah + γh.
Figure 4.3 illustrates in which region of the parameter space each of the three local
maxima is the global maximum. This figure is drawn in ah−al-space, since the influence
of these parameters on the optimal standard is most interesting to study. In this example
the other parameters were fixed at d = 0.5, γl = 0.3 and γh = 0.7. In the graph we
inserted a dotted straight line, starting at ah = 0; al = 0.4. Above this line inequality
(4.7) holds. Below this line we have (4.6), such that labeling the l-type as low ability
students is appropriate.
In the lower right region of the figure, labeled with Ṽh, the relevant branch of V in
equation (4.8) is [5]. In this region the ability of h-students is relatively high in both
dimensions compared to the l-students. Therefore the teacher sets a standard tailored
exactly to h-students, accepting that l-students will drop out. In the central and upper
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right region, labeled Ṽ , branch [4] of V contains the optimum. Abilities of both types
do not differ much and hence the teacher sets the compromise standard s∗. Finally in
the upper left and lower left regions, labeled with Ṽl, the school chooses the standard s∗l
for the l-students, whereas the h-students perform at γh. They do so for two different
reasons. In the upper region with al > 0.4, where branch [6] of V is relevant and (4.7)
holds, the standard is too high for the h-students and they drop out. In the lower part
(al < 0.4, branch [3], and (4.6) holds), the standard is so low that the h-students can
meet it without effort cost.
The next proposition provides comparative statics for the case where the optimal
standard is s∗.
Proposition 4.2 If the optimal standard in a comprehensive school is s∗, it increases
in al, ah, γl and γh. It increases (decreases) in d if ah + γh > (<)al + γl.
Proof.
Differentiating s∗ from (4.9) we obtain:
∂s∗
∂d














= ah(1− d) [ah + d(γh − γl)]




= ald [al − (γh − γl)(1− d)]
[ah(1− d) + ald]2
. (4.13)
(4.12) is positive (negative) if ah+γh > (<)al+γl. (4.13) is positive if al > (γh−γl)(1−d).
As shown in the proof of Proposition 4.1, this is true if s∗ > γh, which must be the case
if s∗ is the optimal choice. 
As expected, for all students the standard increases in both dimensions of ability.
Moreover, the standard increases in the share of the type of students i whose total
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ability, measured by ai + γi, is larger.
We now turn to the question whether two separated classes are preferable to the mixed
class. It is important to distinguish between a comparison of utilities and a comparison
of academic performances. Regarding utilities, no case is possible where students are
better off in the mixed class than in separated classes, because in that case, s∗l and s∗h can
be optimized separately. Hence, comparison of utilities is a straightforward application
of the decentralization theorem by Oates (1972). Notice that the same observation
would hold if we assumed that schools maximize academic performance or wages instead
of students’ utility. In such a model it would be immediate that in the comprehensive
school performance of each type can only be worse than in tracked schools.
In contrast, as we will now show, in our model academic performance can also increase
by mixing the classes. First, we consider for each type of students separately how their
performance changes if classes are merged. For this comparison, observe that in the case
where the optimal standard of the comprehensive school is s∗l (s∗h), the performance
of the h(l)-students is γh (γl), and that the standard s∗ is a weighted average of the
standards chosen in the tracked schools. With this, Proposition 4.1 immediately leads
to:
Proposition 4.3 If the comprehensive school chooses s∗l (s∗h), the performance of h(l)-
students is lower than in the tracked h(l)-school. If the comprehensive school chooses s∗,
the performance of l-students is higher than (lower than, equal to) the performance in
the tracked l-school if al + γl < (>,=)ah + γh. If the comprehensive school chooses s∗,
the performance of h-students is higher than (lower than, equal to) the performance in
the tracked h-school if al + γl > (<,=)ah + γh.
This proposition shows that our model can generate a positive peer group effect
for low ability students, by which we mean the l-students, where (4.6) holds. In a
comprehensive school, teachers will need to find a compromise between the standards
tailored to individual student types. As long as low ability students are still willing
to meet this standard, they will put in more effort than in the separated class. As
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a consequence one will observe higher test results on their part in the comprehensive
school, even if there are no synergy effects from teaching diverse students together.
Furthermore, the reduction of the standard for the h-students might be quite small
when d and/or al are relatively large. Then, as (4.9) shows, the standard of the mixed
class is close to the standard of the h-class. Given confounding influences, an empirical
study might fail to find statistical significance of such a small impact.
The peer group effect obtains only for a subset of the parameter space. As is apparent
from figure 4.3, the learning capacities of both types must not be too different. Otherwise,
if one type finds it substantially easier to learn, the school will set optimal incentives for
this type and put up with the fact that the other type stops graduating. Furthermore
one can show that the Fh = 0 curve shifts downwards if d decreases. Hence, a positive
peer group effect for the low ability students is more likely when these students are more
numerous. In this case the teacher of the comprehensive school puts more weight on
their utility and therefore refrains from setting a standard which overburdens them.
Finally it may also happen that the comprehensive school sets the standard s∗l tailored
to the low ability students. This corresponds to the lower left region of Figure 4.3. In
this case mixing classes leaves the performance of l-students unchanged and reduces the
performance of h-students. However, this decline in performance might be very small,
since learning capacity of h-students is anyway not very large and since they continue
to perform at their initial endowment γh. Therefore, although mixing classes obviously
does not help in this case, the damage it inflicts is small.
The next proposition deals with the effect of merging classes on aggregate performance.
Proposition 4.4 If al + γl < ah + γh, the average productivity of students in a compre-
hensive school exceeds (is equal to, falls short of) the average productivity of students in
tracked schools if and only if learning ability of l-students is larger than (is equal to, is
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smaller than) learning ability of h-students. That is:
s∗ R ds∗h + (1− d)s∗l ⇔ al R ah .
If al + γl > (=)ah + γh, the average productivity of students in a comprehensive school
falls short of (is equal to) the average productivity of students in tracked schools.
Proof. From equation (4.9), we find that s∗ R ds∗h + (1− d)s∗l is equivalent to:
(al − ah)(s∗h − s∗l ) R 0 . (4.14)
In the case al + γl < ah + γh we have s∗h > s∗l , and (4.14) is equivalent to al R ah. In the
case al+γl > ah+γh we have s∗h < s∗l , and (4.14) is equivalent to al Q ah. Since γh > γl,
in this case al > ah must hold. Hence s∗ < ds∗h + (1− d)s∗l . For al + γl = ah + γh, we
have s∗l = s∗h, and (4.14) implies s∗ = ds∗h + (1− d)s∗l . 
This proposition shows that merging classes with heterogeneous students may increase
overall academic performance, even when there are no spillover effects between types
of students. This occurs when students with low initial ability have higher learning
capacity than students with high initial ability. To understand that, consider how the
standard is set in the comprehensive school. The teacher will trade off the net-loss
incurred by l-students when the standard is increased above their optimal standard
s∗l against the net-loss incurred by h-students when the standard is decreased below
s∗h. Since the learning ability of l-students exceeds the learning ability of h-students,
the net-loss of the latter increases faster than the net-loss of the former. Therefore the
optimal standard, where marginal net-losses are equalized, is closer to s∗h than to s∗l .
Hence the optimal standard in the mixed class is higher than the weighted average of
the standards of the separated classes.
This kind of result is likely to be relevant in education systems where students are
tracked early. It is likely that the allocation to different tracks is mostly determined by
the endowment of skills conferred by the family background. At the same time it is well
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possible that students with low endowment have not yet fully unfolded their potential
and correspondingly find it easier to extend their knowledge. In the terminology of
our model these students have high learning capacity al, but low endowment γl. If
these students now attend a comprehensive school, average performance of students will
increase. Both types of students find a relatively high standard acceptable, but they do
so because of different reasons: One group starts with high initial ability and the others
are eager to advance.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we present a model comparing the choice of examination standards by
tracked and untracked schools. The model distinguishes between initial ability and
the capacity or willingness to extend ability. When setting the standard, the school or
teacher takes the student’s disutility of learning into account. Therefore, the resulting
choices differ from the standards which maximizes academic performance, which is the
focus of PISA and similar studies.
Our findings show that in many cases a comprehensive school will enhance performance
of low ability students or even enhance average performance compared to tracked schools
with individual standards. In these cases performance of high ability students decreases,
but this effect may be so small that it is insignificant in an empirical study. Our model
therefore provides a foundation of peer group effects although we abstract from any
synergy effect from teaching different student types together.
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5 Concluding Remarks
This thesis analyzes different questions in the field of education, using the method
of theoretical modeling. In chapter 2 I add a second dimension to the classic utility
function in terms of a non-monetary value, the social status. In a second step social
status explains incentives for possibly influential circles to vote for tuition fees without
direct gain from it. In chapter 3 it is shown that findings in a one shot signaling
game, resulting in grade inflation, can mostly be traced back to the character of the
one shot game. Extending the game in the time dimension to have at least a second
round where the university enjoys the reputation set, grade inflation is decreased, in
some parameter constellations even abolished. Finally, in chapter 4, it is shown that
empirical findings which suggest that in heterogeneous classes the average productivity
is higher than the average in tracked classes, could be an effect of overburdening the low
performing students, who will still meet the high standard for the price of most of their
childhood/free time. this means, politics, society and parents need to balance between
a happy-go-lucky childhood and preparing their children for working life.
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